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We All Need Somebody to Lean On: 
Using the Law to Nurture Our Children, 
Beginning with Third-Party Visitation 
 
By John A. Pappalardo,* 





Perhaps one of the single most important aspects of a 
healthy childhood is emotional support from healthy caregivers.  
As it stands, New York’s visitation law prohibits third-party 
caregivers from stepping in and providing children with this 
important psychological and emotional need by automatically 
denying them standing to seek visitation in court.  In New York, 
third-party standing for visitation is denied solely on a 
procedural basis, irrespective of the child’s personal familial 
situation, namely whether their parents are completely 
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unavailable. Specifically, when a child’s parents become 
unavailable due to death, incarceration or otherwise, and such 
child becomes a ward of the foster care system, the child’s aunt, 
uncle, or other third-party caregiver cannot petition for visitation 
of that child under current New York law.  As a result, the child 
is effectively deprived of necessary emotional connections unless 
the third-party caregiver decides to formally adopt him or her.  
New York’s Domestic Relations Law does not explicitly prohibit 
third-party visitation, but rather this current, nonsensical 
application of New York visitation law has developed through the 
judiciary, which is supposed to serve as these children’s last line 
of defense.  Thus, this piece respectfully calls for the court of this 
progressive State to join other neighboring states in fostering 
relationships between children and healthy caregivers by 
awarding standing for visitation to third-parties when both of 
the child’s parents are completely unavailable to take care of 
them.  
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I.  An Introduction to Perpetual Disappointment and 
Abandonment 
You are eight years old.  When you were two, your father 
died in a tragic car accident as he was commuting home.  Shortly 
after, your only living grandparent, your paternal grandmother, 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/1
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passes away from heartbreak over her son.  You can’t remember 
the details of that year, but you do remember your mother 
heavily relying on her sister to make it through this tough time.    
Although only your aunt, she treated you and your siblings like 
her own children.  She did not have the means to take care of 
you, your mother, and your siblings, as she had her own large 
family and simply did not have the space or finances.  However, 
she did just about everything else for your family.  In fact, the 
extent of your childhood memories involves your aunt and her 
husband, your uncle.  When you were four, they taught you how 
to swing a bat and brought you to the movies.  When you were 
five, they helped you with your reading homework and attended 
all of your school concerts.  When you made a mistake, they 
spoke to you as if you were their equal.  Any time you were sad, 
they were understanding and went out of their way to comfort 
you.  They frequently provided for you and your siblings, 
including buying everyone school supplies and clothes every 
year.  They sometimes even helped your mother with the grocery 
bill.  Your aunt and uncle hosted all of the holidays and had your 
family over for dinner with your cousins every Sunday.  You and 
your siblings loved them like your own parents, and they loved 
you back.  You would never say it out loud because it would 
break your mother’s heart, but you secretly wished they were 
your parents instead. 
By the time you were six, your mother became physically 
abusive toward you and your siblings because she had never 
really dealt with the pain of losing your biological father.  
Having zero tolerance for this behavior, your aunt and uncle 
wanted to take in you and your siblings, but your mother refused 
to allow it.  Angry and bitter, your mother rejected any attempt 
they made to see you.  Your aunt and uncle looked into filing for 
visitation, but, before they were even given the opportunity to be 
heard by a judge, they were immediately denied standing by the 
court because they were not your biological parents.  Shortly 
after their inquiry, your mother was incarcerated for strangling 
your sister, and, as a result, you and your siblings were taken 
into the state’s custody. 
Foster care was a foreign term to you; you had no idea what 
it meant, but you quickly found out; your life changed in the 
blink of an eye.  Before arriving at your new group home, you 
3
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were forced to separate from your siblings because there weren’t 
enough available beds in one facility.  Being surrounded by 
strangers was a scary feeling for you.  It was December, but the 
festive joy quickly disappeared from your life because you 
realized you will be spending the holidays without your family.  
You are confused because you know you haven’t done anything 
wrong to deserve this, but yet you feel like you are being 
punished as if you have committed a crime. 
A few months pass before you are told by a staff member 
that your mother has died from a drug overdose.  This hits you 
hard and you suddenly start to feel entirely alone.  The slight 
glimmer of hope that your mother would return for you has now 
completely extinguished.  No one in the group home has the 
ability to make your extreme sadness go away because they can’t 
relate to your circumstances.  The only people who know what 
you’re going through are your siblings and your aunt and uncle.  
You wish you were home right now.  Where is your aunt and 
uncle?  You thought they would have at least come to see you; 
you thought they cared.  Little do you know that, as your only 
living family members, they tried to petition for visitation a 
second time when you were in foster care, but the court yet again 
refused to even hear their case based on the fact that they were 
not your biological or adoptive parents or grandparents.  They 
weren’t even allowed to visit you in foster care. 
This fictional anecdote is loosely based on the facts in the 
New York Appellate Division case, In re Katrina E.1  It is an 
illustration of the harsh emotional and psychological effects that 
current visitation laws potentially have on children raised by 
non-traditional families.  One can only imagine what it is like to 
be an eight-year-old child forced to live in foster care because 
their parent(s) physically abused them; traumatic, confusing, 
and lonely are a few words that might come to mind.  At eight 
years old, a child should only be exposed to trivial decisions such 
as whether they prefer sports over music, acting over singing, or 
playing outside over gaming.  Their only worries should consist 
of whether their team is going to win the championship game, if 
their friends will be able to hang out with them this weekend, or 
if they will be able to perform well at their dance recital.  
 
 1.  636 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1996). 
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Children shouldn’t have to think twice about relying on adults 
so they can be left free to live their lives as kids; they should be 
able to assume that their needs are going to be highly prioritized 
and taken care of by adults.  However, it cannot be said that New 
York’s judicial and legislative systems are facilitating this goal 
when the implementation of current visitation laws fail to 
endorse and promote relationships between children and third-
party caregivers that are crucial to the development of the child 
and the betterment of our society. 
The purpose of this note is to highlight the importance of a 
child’s relationship with non-biological parental figures and 
urge members of New York’s judicial and legislative systems to 
better protect the needs of children.  More specifically, the goal 
is to bring attention to the nonsensical, tragic upshot of the 
automatic denial of third-party visitation.  Part II of this note 
will explore the emotional and developmental needs of children 
in further detail.  Parts III and IV will review New York’s prior 
legal changes in the area of visitation law by analyzing past and 
current law, respectively, as well as illustrate the disconnect 
between childrens’ emotional needs and the execution of current 
visitation laws.  Finally, the judiciary’s historical role in 
effectuating necessary change in the law will be examined in 
Part IV, as well as an argument that the current disconnect is 
the judiciary’s obligation and responsibility to remediate. 
 
II.  The Instinctual and Universal Need for Emotional 
Connections 
It is a psychological certainty that all children instinctively 
share particular emotional needs which must be satisfied in 
order to foster their healthy development.2  An emotionally 
stable child requires continuity, love, care, support, guidance, 
and understanding–attributes that are primarily achieved 
through communication with healthy adults.3  “Communication 
 
 2.  See generally EILEEN JOHNSON, THE CHILDREN'S BILL OF EMOTIONAL 
RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN (2011) (explaining children’s 
innate emotional needs and what occurs when these needs are not met). 
 3.  See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 5 (stating “children are vulnerable 
beings who are dependent on other beings—adults”); Katherine T. 
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal 
5
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. . . is one of the most vital aspects of human life[;] . . . 
[d]evelopment of one’s ideas and thought processes [is] 
contingent on being listened to and validated by respected 
caregivers.”4  Studies have shown there is a significant benefit 
that comes from continued contact with third parties functioning 
as parents, and, contrariwise, if this bond is terminated, 
children are likely to suffer “emotional distress and possible 
substantial psychological harm.”5  Thus, it is a proven theory 
that children who are able to form meaningful connections with 
those who love and care for them are more likely to become high-
functioning members of society.6 
Conversely, it is close to inevitable that children who are 
forced to grow up without healthy parents develop emotional 
issues, whether they surface now or later in life.7  When children 
and adolescents are not fortunate enough to maintain emotional 
connections with healthy adults, they commonly react to such 
lack of emotional satisfaction by acting out, entering into a 
depression, developing and experiencing anxiety, and/or 
emotionally withdrawing from their present circumstances.8 
 
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 
879, 90211 (1984) (highlighting and substantiating the significance of 
continuity in a child’s life, even at the risk of some uncertainty or instability); 
Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for Non-Parents after Troxel v. Granville: Where 
Should States Draw the Line?, 32 Rutgers L.J. 783, 791 (2001) (“Child 
development experts point to the importance of ensuring continuity of a child's 
relationships with caregiving adults.”). 
 4.  JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 12. 
 5.  Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: 
Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference after Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 865, 892 (2003). 
 6.  See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 21; Bartlett, supra note 3, at 
90211 (explaining that separation from caregivers is detrimental to children). 
 7.  Andrea Brandt, 4 Ways That Childhood Trauma Impacts Adults, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Jun. 1, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/ 
mindful-anger/201706/4-ways-childhood-trauma-impacts-adults (stating 
“[w]hether you witnessed or experienced violence as a child or your caretakers 
emotionally or physically neglected you, when you grow up in a traumatizing 
environment you are likely to still show signs of that trauma as an adult”). 
 8.  See MARION BOWER & JUDITH TROWELL, THE EMOTIONAL NEEDS OF 
YOUNG CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: USING PSYCHOANALYTIC IDEAS IN THE 
COMMUNITY 13 (Marion Bower & Judith Trowell eds., 1996) (listing various 
coping mechanisms that humans instinctively use to deal with emotional 
conflicts including repression, which leads to being “cut off and out of touch” 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/1
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It is important to note that these responses are not 
necessarily intentional, but rather instinctive defense 
mechanisms to protect their well-being.9  When left uncorrected, 
emotional instability and trauma is likely to have a “lifelong and 
often irrevocable impact in shaping the nature of the adult.”10  
This is because a child’s brain is different from an adult’s in that 
it is more susceptible to influence,11 making emotional damage 
more difficult to overcome.12  Issues that are suppressed by 
children will pave the way for criminal or self-destructive 
behavior,13 as the same repressed emotional traumas will 
without doubt resurface at a later time in life.14 
 
and displacement, which leads to aggressively (and seemingly irrationally) 
acting out one’s anger onto others); JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 21 (cautioning 
that not only is a child is subject to developing anxiety, hyper-vigilance, or 
depression when their first cries are ignored by parents, but also a “[l]ack of 
emotional responsiveness . . . can result in shyness, insecurity, anger, and anti-
social or self-destructive behavior”). 
 9.  Megan Glynn Crane, Childhood Trauma's Lurking Presence in the 
Juvenile Interrogation Room and the Need for A Trauma-Informed 
Voluntariness Test for Juvenile Confessions, 62 S.D. L. REV. 626, 643 (2017) 
(“where a child endures repeated or chronic stress, the body suppresses the 
stress response in order to normalize cortisol levels”); Jerry von Talge, 
Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family 
Violence Directed Toward Women and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 111, 137 (2000) (stating that children repress feelings as an 
unconscious defense mechanism when negative emotional feelings become too 
painful to handle). 
 10.  JOHNSON, supra note 2, at viii. 
 11.  Patrick Harty, Book Note, The Moral and Economic Advantages of 
Raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility in New York Among Juvenile 
Offenders, and Plans for Rehabilitation, 33 TOURO L. REV. 1099, 1099 (2017) 
(stating “research has shown that adolescents . . . are . . . more susceptible to 
outside influences”). 
 12.  JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 5, 6. 
 13.  Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and 
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 337 (2002) (stating “[t]he emotional 
unconscious also appears to be the basis for self-destructive habits that can 
possibly lead to criminal behavior”); Mark Tran, Diagnosed Depression Linked 
to Violent Crime, Says Oxford University Study, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2015, 5:31 
AM) (stating that, according to psychiatric experts, “[p]eople diagnosed with 
depression are roughly three times more likely than the general population to 
commit violent crimes”). 
 14.  JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 7. 
7
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Although it is ideal for biological parents to be the 
caregivers that fulfill their children’s emotional needs, this is 
frequently not the case.  In fact, it is becoming more common for 
children to form close connections with extended family 
members and biological strangers than ever before.15  In many 
cases where there is an absence of adequate parental care, other 
non-parental third parties, such as aunts, uncles, grandparents, 
neighbors, family friends, stepparents, and foster parents, step 
in and establish supportive and emotionally beneficial 
connections to children who would otherwise have no one to love 
and care for them.  Although not considered traditional, 
relationships between non-parental caregivers and children can 
be considerably beneficial to children.16  “As the child grows, his 
emotional life depends on the strength of [the caregiver-child] 
connection;”17 maintaining such relationship is in the best 
interest of the child.  Thus, the relationship between a caregiver 
and a child should be highly valued by our court system 
notwithstanding the parties’ biological affiliation. 
 
III.  A Brief History of Visitation Rights in America 
 
Historically speaking, visitation disputes regarding minor 
children have been brought by many different people such as 
grandparents, de facto parents, stepparents, and even third 
parties in general.  As far back as 1966, we can see the 
conflicting opinions throughout the courts as to visitation and 
how it applies to Grandparents and third-parties.  Specifically, 
grandparents’ visitation rights have drastically changed over 
the past years, showing an increase in the opinion that visitation 
does not necessarily take away from parent custodial rights.  
When comparing pre-1990s to the present, we went from a time 
 
 15.  See generally John DeWitt Gregory, Redefining the Family: 
Undermining the Family, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 385 (2004) (stating that 
“we are in a transitional stage along the continuum from sanctioning only 
biologically based families to legally recognizing functional families”) (quoting 
James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 923, 936 (2001)). 
 16.  Maldonado, supra note 5, at 870.  
 17.  JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 21. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/1
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where most courts had differing opinions on grandparent 
visitation, to now, when every state has some type of law 
allowing grandparents to have visitation rights.18 
Grandparents have had standing to petition for visitation 
in some courts as far back as 1966.19  Courts have stated that 
they “[do] not believe that visitation rights to a grandparent 
would in effect diminish the custody of the respondent,” and that 
the visitation should be granted when in the best interest of the 
child.20  Although some courts have determined that visitation 
for grandparents was acceptable, state supreme courts 
continued to have mixed rulings until the 1990s.21  Some 
examples over the years are: (1) in 1992, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court held that the parental rights were not violated by 
grandparent visitation,22 (2) in 1993, the Missouri Supreme 
Court held that if you were granting grandparent visitation in 
the best interest of the child, then it was not a constitutional 
violation,23 (3) in 1996, the Supreme Court of Florida held that 
when a child is residing with both parents, and one of the 
parents was against the visitation, then the visitation statute as 
it relates to grandparents violated the parent’s constitutional 
right to the upbringing of their child,24 and (4) in 1998, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the grandparent visitation 
statute was unconstitutionally applied and, therefore, violated 
the Parents’ right to the management of their minor Child 
because the statute allowed the disruption of an intact nuclear 
family against the wishes of both parents.25  These differing 
opinions across the states as it applies to grandparent visitation 
is an illustration of how, over time, courts are slowly adapting to 
new social norms in the context of families and the upbringing 
of their children. 
 
 18.  Maldonado, supra note 5, at 892. 
 19.  See generally, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 269 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Fam. Ct. 
1966). 
 20.  Anonymous v. Anonymous, 269 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Fam. Ct. 1966). 
 21.  Bartlett, supra note 3, at 90211 (explaining that separation from 
caregivers is detrimental to children). 
 22.  King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Ky. 1992).  
 23.  Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993).  
 24.  Beagle v. Beagle, 678 S.O.2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996). 
 25.  Herbst v. Sayre, 971 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1998).  
9
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When looking back on the 1991 well-known case, Alison D. 
v. Virginia M., one can see that the Court decided on the issue 
of visitation as it applies to same-sex couples, which, if decided 
in this manner today, would be shocking.26  In this case, two 
women were in a romantic relationship and decided to have a 
child by means of artificial insemination.27  Together, the couple 
agreed on the terms of conception, birth, and all other child 
rearing decisions.28  Further, they agreed to share joint 
responsibilities in raising this child.29  However, when the child 
was four years old, the parents decided to end their 
relationship.30  The visitation between the child and the 
Petitioner continued for a few years, but once the relationship 
between both mothers diminished, the Respondent cut all ties 
with the Petitioner and did not allow contact with the child.31  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Court’s decision holding 
that the Petitioner was a biological stranger to the child and did 
not meet the requirements of a “parent” under New York’s 
Domestic Relations Law. 32  Therefore, she could not petition for 
visitation with the child.33 
Third-party visitation has also been highly debated in the 
past, even in cases where the third party is one who assumes the 
parental role in a child’s life.34  In 1987, Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG. 
was brought by a petitioner who raised a child for the first year 
of the child’s life, signed the child’s birth certificate, and held 
himself out as the father to this child.35  The Court held that, not 
only could the Petitioner not have visitation, but also that he did 
not have the standing to even petition for it because he was not 




 26.  572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 76 (N.Y. 1987). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 77. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/1
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IV.  Where Current Visitation Law Is Failing Our Children 
 
Currently, third party visitation is still not acknowledged 
in the State of New York, even though many states across the 
United States are creating statutes that would allow this to 
occur.37  New York has two statutes that apply to standing in 
regards to petitioning for visitation.38  Section 71 of the Domestic 
Relations Law allows for siblings to have standing for 
visitation.39  The statute provides: 
 
Where circumstances show that conditions exist 
which equity would see fit to intervene, a brother 
or sister or, if he or she be a minor, a proper person 
on his or her behalf of a child, whether by half or 
whole blood, may apply to the supreme court by 
commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of 
habeas corpus to have such child brought before 
such court, or may apply to the family court 
pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred 
fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return 
thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the 
parent or any other person or party having the 
care, custody, and control of such child, to be given 
in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may 
make such directions as the best interest of the 
child is he may require, for visitation rights for 
such brother or sister in respect to such child.40 
  
Section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law allows standing 
to grandparents for visitation.41  The statute provides:  
 
Where either or both of the parents of a minor 
child, residing within this state, is or are 
deceased, or where circumstances show that 
 
 37.  See generally Romasz v. Coombs, 55 N.Y.S.3d 770 (App. Div. 2017).  
 38.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 71, 72 (McKinney 2010). 
 39.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 2010). 
 40.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 2010). 
 41.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2010). 
11
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conditions exist which equity would see fit to 
intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents of 
such child may apply to the supreme court by 
commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of 
habeas corpus to have such child brought before 
such court, or may apply to the family court 
pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred 
fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return 
thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the 
parent or any other person or party having the 
care, custody, and control of such child, to be given 
in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may 
make such directions as the best interest of the 
child may require, for visitation rights for such 
grandparent or grandparents in respect to such 
child.42 
 
Neither statute “expressly . . . exclude[s] other classes of 
individuals.”43  One could certainly argue that to do so would 
create a biological hierarchy where there is a divine presumption 
that a grandparent or sibling has been more influential in a 
child’s life than an aunt, uncle, or family friend.  With that said, 
ever since the Supreme Court of the United States decided in 
Troxel v. Granville, states have been unsure how to apply third-
party visitation statutes.44  In Troxel v. Granville, paternal 
grandparents sought visitation of their grandson after his 
father, their son, had passed away.45  At the time, Washington 
had a visitation statute that said any person, at any time, can 
petition the Court for visitation.46  The trial court granted 
visitation to the grandparents, but the Supreme Court of 
Washington reversed, stating that the statute infringed on the 
 
 42.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2010). 
 43.  John A. Pappalardo, New York State’s Refusal to Promote Visitation 
Between Foster Care Children and their Extended Family, 23 WESTCHESTER B. 
J. 189, 191 (LEXIS 1996). 
 44.  See generally Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights after 
Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279 (2000). 
 45.  530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000). 
 46.  Id.  
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parents fundamental right to the upbringing of their child.47  
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, 
it rendered an opinion specifically on the Washington statute, 
stating that it was “breathtakingly broad” and did not give any 
special weight to parents.48  Ever since this opinion was written, 
states have been unsure how to construct and implement third-
party visitation statutes.49 
One case in which a court has gotten it right is Brooke S.B. 
v. Elizabeth A.C.C.50  This is a case where the Court had the 
gumption to overturn Alison D.51 In In re Brooke, two women 
were engaged to be married and jointly decided they wanted to 
have a child.52  Together, they decided that the Respondent 
would be artificially inseminated with the Child.53  Petitioner 
was consistently engaged in the Respondent’s pregnancy, as she 
helped to take care of Respondent, attended routine doctors’ 
appointments and an emergency room visit when Respondent 
experienced some complications.54  After Respondent gave birth 
to their son, the couple raised him together for approximately a 
year.  The Child even referred to the petitioner as “Mama B.”55  
One year after the Child was born, the parties decided to end 
their relationship.  At first, the Respondent allowed the 
Petitioner to have visitation with their son, and the petitioner 
remained involved in his life.56  However, after some time, the 
Respondent cut all contact with Petitioner and isolated her from 
the Child.57  As a result, Petitioner proceeded to file for visitation 
and custody of their son, even though the precedent in Alison D., 
discussed supra, held that she did not have standing to do so.58  
The Family Court expressed that this case was “heartbreaking” 
but that the petitioner did not adopt the child and therefore was 
 
 47.  See generally id. 
 48.  Id. at 67. 
 49.  Buss, supra note 44. 
 50.  61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016). 
 51.  Id. at 490. 
 52.  Id. at 49091.  
 53.  Id. at 491. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 491 (N.Y. 2016).  
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
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not a parent as the statute intended.59 The attorney for the child 
appealed the case and the Appellate Division unanimously 
affirmed the decision, stating that there was no biological 
relationship nor an adoption and therefore had no standing to 
seek custody or visitation.60 Instead of disallowing visitation 
rights to third parties, it decided that when a partner can show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to 
conceive and raise the child together, then the partner has 
standing to seek visitation as a parent.61  When comparing 
where we were to where we are, yes we have improved in this 
area, however, we still have a long way to go. 
A puzzling aspect of current visitation law in New York is 
that the State does not allow third parties to have standing to 
petition for visitation, but courts are still actively awarding 
visitation to third parties during custody proceedings.62  Strobel 
v. Danielson is a case where the father of the child murdered the 
mother of the child.63  The father was sent to prison and would 
remain there for the rest of his life,64 leaving the child with no 
parents or custodian.65  Both the grandmother and the aunt of 
the child petitioned the Court for full custody66 under Domestic 
Relations Law 240, which states that anyone with an important 
role in the child’s life may petition for custody in extraordinary 
circumstances, which were met in this case.67  Prior to the 
hearing, the Family Court “awarded the grandmother sole 
custody of the child, with scheduled visitation to the aunt.”68  
This is a situation where the aunt did not have standing to 
petition for visitation, but was granted it once she petitioned for 
custody and lost in her attempt to gain it over the 
grandmother.69  It is unexplainable why New York courts think 
that it is sensible to order visitation to third parties during 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 501. 
 62.  See generally Strobel v. Danielson, 74 N.Y.S.3d 387 (App. Div. 2018).  
 63.  Id. at 388. 
 64.  Id. at 389.  
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 389. 
 67.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2015). 
 68.  Strobel, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 389. 
 69.  See generally id. 
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custody proceedings, but will not allow these same third parties 
to petition for visitation without having a custody petition 
filed.70 
Another instance in which New York courts will grant 
visitation to third parties is under the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel.  Equitable estoppel is a doctrine imposed by the law as 
a matter of fairness.71  Its purpose is to “preclude a person from 
asserting a right after having led another to form the reasonable 
belief that the right would not be asserted, and loss or prejudice 
to the other would result if the right were asserted.”72  Under 
this doctrine, the Court generally requires a showing of an 
agreement between the parties, usually predating the birth of 
the child in question, which displays the intent to raise the child 
as a cohesive family.73  The Court imposes the doctrine “to 
prevent the enforcement of rights which would work a fraud or 
injustice upon the person against whom enforcement is sought 
and who, in justifiable reliance upon the opposing party’s words 
or conduct, has been misled into acting upon the belief that such 
enforcement would not be sought.”74  In matters where a prior 
agreement can be substantiated, the court will give great 
deference to the parties’ agreement.  For example, if three people 
agree to conceive and raise a child together as one family unit, 
courts will uphold the agreement under the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel.75  The application of this doctrine can be beneficial to 
the child because it maintains the third-party parental 
relationship; however, equitable estoppel is a difficult standard 
to overcome because there must be a prior agreement between 
the parties.  Without this agreement, third parties would be left 
without standing; there is no way that a third-party parent can 
turn back time and create this agreement.  Therefore, there are 





 70.  Id. 
 71. Christopher YY. v. Jessica ZZ., 69 N.Y.S.3d 887, 894 (App. Div. 2018). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (App. Div. 2002). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See, e.g., David S. v. Samantha G., 74 N.Y.S.3d 730 (2018). 
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V.  The Judiciary’s Responsibility to Fix the Callous Disconnect 
 
As one can see, despite a magnitude of research regarding 
the needs of children, there is an extreme disconnect between 
what is best for child development and visitation law as it stands 
today.  It is important to mention the dissenting opinion in 
Alison D., where, at the time, soon-to-be Chief Judge Judith 
Kaye stated “the impact of today’s decision falls hardest on the 
children of those relationships, limiting their opportunity to 
maintain bonds that may be crucial to their development.”76 
As discussed, supra, third parties, no matter how interested 
or involved they are in the child’s life, (to the extent they are not 
a grandparent or sibling) are automatically denied standing to 
seek visitation merely because of the nature or type of their 
biological ties to the child.  The only time a court awards a non-
biological parent visitation is as a lesser award when petitioning 
for custody or under the incredibly difficult doctrine of equitable 
estoppel.  This means that, under current law, even when a 
biological parent is completely unavailable to the child, whether 
it be by death, neglect, or a prior termination of parental rights, 
courts will still refuse to so much as consider a visitation petition 
from anyone who is not a parent, grandparent, or sibling unless 
there was prior written consent by the biological parent to the 
formation of the third-party parental relationship with the child 
under the incredibly difficult doctrine of equitable estoppel.77 
Although it is well established that there should be great 
weight given to the rights of biological and adoptive parents 
when ruling on third-party visitation,78 the concept that a child, 
with unavailable parents and grandparents, is automatically 
precluded from maintaining a healthy relationship with a non-
parental caregiver is an illogical and nonsensical application of 
the law proven to be severely injurious to society.79  As a result, 
 
 76.  Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991). 
 77.  For example, when a couple agrees to conceive with the help of a 
surrogate.  See 3 NY FAM. CT. LAW & PRAC. § 16:54. 
 78.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 79.  JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 21; Bartlett, supra note 3, at 
90211 (stating that “[a]n absence of permanence in a [child’s life] may cause 
him [or her] to have difficulty learning self-control and absorbing a value 
system”). 
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loving and caring relationships with non-parental adults are 
eliminated from a child’s life even if they do not have anyone else 
to turn to.  In its application of the law, courts are essentially 
making a statement that they would rather the child not be 
visited by anyone than be visited by someone who is not a parent, 
grandparent, or sibling; the idea is preposterous!  When parents 
and grandparents are unavailable, the placement of a third 
party non-biological parental figure into a child’s life is 
something that cannot be automatically ruled out and must be 
entertained within the best interests of the child(ren).  If we take 
away the only connections that these children have, we are 
leaving them with a slim chance to recover from their situations 
and become productive adults.  Additionally, their emotional and 
psychological issues will go untreated and be passed down to 
future generations. 
Given the court’s responsibility to protect the best interest 
of children,80 as well as its interest in maintaining a safe and 
productive society, it is incumbent upon our judicial system to 
create an environment which nurtures the relationships 
between our youth and their parental figures by allowing third 
parties standing to petition for visitation upon a showing of 
parental unavailability.  The future of our youth relies on this 
judicial change in the way visitation law is applied.  
Disappointingly, however, the current hardline prohibition 
against standing for third-party visitation does the exact 
opposite. 
 
A. Why the Judiciary? 
 
During the formation of our country in the eighteenth 
century, our founding fathers created a bedrock foundation 
consisting of three separate branches of government, all of which 
were to function independently of each other while at the same 
time retain the ability to check and monitor the other 
 
 80.  Determining the Best Interests of the Child, CHILD WELFARE INFO. 
GATEWAY (2016) (stating that courts are responsible for considering the best 
interest of the child when ruling on placement and custody determinations, 
safety and permanency planning, and proceedings for termination of parental 
rights). 
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branches.81  Ever since, the judiciary has been charged with the 
responsibility to safeguard the rights that were given to 
Americans under the Constitution.82  Specifically, the protection 
of constitutional rights is achieved through judicial review, a 
power established by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison 
which consists of the ability to assess the constitutionality of 
legislative and executive actions.83 
As Alexander Hamilton once stated, “there is no liberty, if 
the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and 
executive powers;”84 steadfast protection of the People’s 
constitutional rights can only be accomplished through 
impartial application of the law.  Described as the “crown 
jewel”85 of our government, judicial independence is essential to 
democracy, liberty, and freedom; it is what generates fair and 
impartial trials.86  Once outside forces infiltrate the judicial 
system, decisions are no longer made with freedom in mind;87 
the decisions become predetermined rather than resolved on the 
merits.88  In order for the system of checks and balances to 
properly work, the judiciary must be able to “check” the law 
when situations before it present themselves as unfair. 
Furthermore, history indicates that it is not uncommon for 
the judiciary to provoke change in the law, especially in the 
areas that contain cracks which need filling.  In the 1950s, it was 
the Court that provoked the desegregation of schools by making 
an unparalleled decision in Brown v. Board of Education,89 
which was subsequently followed by the legislature’s anti-
discrimination laws.  In the early 2000s, the Court contributed 
 
 81.  Janet Stidman Eveleth, Preserving Our Judicial Independence, 37-
AUG MD. B.J. 58, 60 (2004); J. Zak Ritchie, The Separation of Powers and the 
Judicial Rulemaking Power: The Judicial Authority of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals Includes Legislative Privilege, 2018-SUM W. VA. L. 34 (2018). 
 82.  Id. at 58.  
 83.  5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 84.  Symposium, The Ethics of Judicial Selection, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 141, 
148 (2001). 
 85.  Id. at 14243; see also Eveleth, supra note 81, at 62.  
 86.  Eveleth, supra note 81, at 62.  
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id.  
 89.  349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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to marriage equality through unprecedented opinions,90 and now 
same-sex marriage is recognized throughout the United States.91  
Likewise, unmarried fathers have obtained certain rights 
through innovative decisions from the judiciary.92  For example, 
until the 1970s, when children in Illinois were born out of 
wedlock to unavailable mothers, they automatically became 
wards of the state without even so much as a hearing on the 
unwed father’s fitness as a parent.93  It was only in 1972, due to 
the Court’s landmark decision in Stanley v. Illinois, that an 
unwed father’s right was finally upheld to participate in their 
child’s life in a situation where the mother was unavailable.  
There’s a distinct parallel that can be drawn between the 
situations in Stanley and the current third-party visitation 
crisis: courts have the important responsibility of protecting the 
child’s best interest absent a parent’s availability. 
The Court in Troxel v. Granville denied standing to third 
parties because it backed a presumption that available parents 
make decisions that are in the best interest of the child.94  
However, a situation in which the parents are completely 
unavailable is much different than that presented in Troxel 
because no parent is available to make decisions, eliminating the 
court’s presumption.  When there aren’t any available parents, 
 
 90.  See generally United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) 
(overruling the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined a marriage, for the 
purposes of the federal government, as a union between one man and one 
woman); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling sodomy laws); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a state constitution which 
prevented homosexuals from being placed in a protected class). 
 91.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (declaring that the 
Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage). 
 92.  See, e.g., In re Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418 (holding 
unconstitutional Domestic Relations Law § 111(1), which provided that, “while 
an unwed mother's consent is always required[,] an unwed father's consent to 
the adoption of his under-six-month-old child is required only where he has 
openly lived with the child or the mother for six continuous months 
immediately preceding the child's placement for adoption, openly 
acknowledged his paternity during such period, and paid reasonable 
pregnancy and birth expenses in accordance with his means”). 
 93.  Deborah Davis Alleman, Adoption: The Constitutional Rights of 
Unwed Fathers, 40 LA. L. REV. 923, 925 (1980). 
 94.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Maldonado, supra note 5, at 
870. 
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courts become the child’s last line of defense.  They are wholly 
responsible for protecting their best interests, which, when a 
child does not have any parents, indisputably consists of the 
maintenance of any and all third-party caregiving relationships.  
Thus, visitation laws must be expanded to allow third parties a 
chance to intercede and complete the job of child rearing when 
parents cannot. 
Courts must immediately prompt legal change in these 
unjust visitation laws.  Judges must eliminate the unnecessary 
hardline rule against non-parental standing and instead grant 
standing to third parties upon a determination that the parents 
of a child are unavailable, whether it be by death, neglect, or 
termination of parental rights.  It is only fair to a child who has 
no one else available to protect him or her.  Our judicial system 
is doing a complete disservice to our children by refusing to 
extend visitation rights to third parties.  We owe it to these 
deserted children to at least consider their relationship with the 
third-party caregiver and explore their next-best avenues when 
parents are unavailable. 
 
B. Weighing the Pros and Cons 
 
Although change should not be made without an 
examination of its potential negative effects, no consequence of 
third-party visitation can be worse than setting up a child for 
failure.  Firstly, and most importantly, courts would not be 
undermining legislative intent when altering their application 
of visitation law.  This is because New York’s Domestic Relations 
Law does not explicitly prohibit third-party visitation; rather, 
this irrational application has developed over time through case 
law.  Therefore, courts will be able to grant standing to third 
parties without defying statutory law. 
One could make the argument that expanding standing for 
visitation petitions would inevitably create more filed petitions 
or be more expensive for courts; however, this should not deter 
change because, ultimately, the best interests of the child must 
be the main concern.  “Procedure by presumption is always 
cheaper and easier than individualized determination.  But 
when . . . the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of 
competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/1
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realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks 
running roughshod over the important interests of both parent 
and child.  It therefore cannot stand.”95 
A child absolutely should never be precluded from 
obtaining visitation with their third-party caregiver just because 
courts do not feel like handling more petitions.  This is no excuse, 
especially for an institution which was empowered and charged 
with the responsibility to care for the best interests of our youth. 
Additionally, this change in the law will not hurt children 
because, even if standing to petition is granted to third parties, 
courts will still be there to filter out harmful third-party 
relationships and only grant visitation when in the best interest 
of the child.  The thing that is being sought is standing to 
petition for visitation, or, in other words, a mere consideration, 
and not an automatic denial, of children’s relationships with 
non-parental caregivers.  These caregivers deserve their day in 
court, at a minimum for the children’s sake. 
It can also be argued that allowing standing for third 
parties to petition for visitation will effectively deter the same 
parties from applying for custody of the same children, thus 
creating a reliance on the foster care system while at the same 
time enjoying the fruits of their visitation rights.  Additionally, 
a child may feel confused about why their aunt or uncle only 
wishes to visit them and not actually take custody of them.  
Albeit a practical argument, this should not prevent a child from 
the benefits that come from a meaningful parent-like 
relationship through visitation.  Maybe the aunt and uncle do 
not have the financial means to take the child in, but would like 
to provide him or her with emotional support.  The law simply 
cannot get in their way, as the child is receiving more support 
than he or she would have had there been no standing for 
visitation at all.  The courts have to support adults who wish to 
continue healthy relationships with children without assuming 
all of the encumbering parental responsibilities.  It must 
facilitate such an arrangement, not impede it! 
A final argument could be that courts would be stepping into 
ambiguous, murky territory in attempting to classify the types 
of third parties that will be granted visitation and those who will 
 
 95.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 65657 (1972). 
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be denied.  However, this is a challenge that courts should be 
able to face, as it should not be much different than a visitation 
hearing for parents, grandparents, or siblings.  More simply 
stated, it is their obligation to face such a challenge. 
In the long run, allowing third-party standing upon a 
showing of parental unavailability will prove to be beneficial 
because it will provide hope and love to children who are 
orphaned, neglected, and abandoned – children who otherwise 
would have no one to emotionally support them and would 
probably otherwise seek fulfillment of their needs through other 
more dangerous avenues such as prostitution and drug dealing.  
Ideally, the maintenance of this support system will help the 
child grow into a productive member of society. 
It can also be argued that children have a fundamental, 
constitutional right to the protection of their best interests.96  If 
the right to conceive a child is a constitutional right, certainly 
the law should provide for the protection of the children so 
conceived.  Additionally, if the Court has decided that the 
Constitution provides parents with the fundamental right to 
control the upbringing of their child, it should certainly also hold 
that these children have a fundamental right to be protected. 
Furthermore, not only is the current application of 
visitation law a huge disregard toward the various situations 
that can occur in non-traditional families, but it also statistically 
provides a great disadvantage to African-American families, 
which have historically embraced and relied upon community 
parenting, or parenting which involves more than just two 
parents, for economic and other purposes.97  There is no doubt 
 
 96.  Carl Funderburk, Best Interest of the Child Should Not Be an 
Ambiguous Term, 33 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 229, 247 (2013). 
 97.  Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 47, 
57 (2007) (explaining the practice of othermothering, or when more than one 
woman takes on mothering responsibilities for a child, and its economic 
necessity in the African-American community); Krystal L. Sorrentino, The 
Social Security Caste System and the Family Benefit: Whose Family Is it Really 
Benefitting?, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 137, 14445 (2011) (“Traditionally, 
families of European descent tend[] to emphasize a ‘conjugal structure’ 
(kinship based on marriage), while families of African descent tend[] to 
organize based on ‘consanguineous’ ideals (kinship that is biologically based 
and centered on blood ties)”) (citing Niara SUDARKASA, INTERPRETING THE 
AFRICAN HERITAGE IN AFRO-AMERICAN FAMILY ORGANIZATION, IN AMERICAN 
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that by ignorantly assuming that every family has one mother, 
one father, and four grandparents, at least one of whom will 
definitely be present to take care of the minor child(ren), courts 
are showing an implicit bias toward traditional, white families, 
sometimes called the “eurocentric family structure” or the 
“nuclear family.”98  The judiciary should not be allowed to 
interpret the Constitution to tolerate political enforcement of 
white suburbia.  Rather, the law should accommodate all 
different types of familial backgrounds established across all 
races and ethnic groups. 
 
C. Learning from Our Neighbors 
 
In comparison to other states, New York is way behind 
trending law, as many states throughout the country are moving 
toward fostering relationships between caregivers and children 
regardless of biological affiliation.99  The recent trend to consider 
the best interest of the child as a paramount concern is reflected 
in case law, as well as the establishment of more lenient 
visitation statutes.  As a historically progressive state, our 
legislature should follow the inclination of other states in 
working toward this noble objective. 
In Youmans v. Ramos, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts affirmed the visitation rights of an 11-year-old 
child’s maternal aunt despite objections from the Child’s 
 
FAMILIES 59-69 (Stephanie Coontz, Maya Parson & Gabrielle Raley eds., 
1999)); see also Herbert Fain & Kimberly Fain, Socio-Economic Status and 
Legal Factors Affecting African-American Fathers, 21 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & 
SOC. POL'Y 1, 1920 (2013) (stating how, in African households, “raising 
children is more of a collective effort with strong neighborhood support-the ‘it 
takes a village’ model”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98.  The term “eurocentric family structure” was coined by Laura Ann 
Foster in 2001 when she wrote about race and gender discrimination for 
African American families in social security law.  Laura Ann Foster, Social 
Security and African-American Families: Unmasking Race and Gender 
Discrimination, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 55 (2001); see also Krystal L. 
Sorrentino, The Social Security Caste System and the Family Benefit: Whose 
Family Is it Really Benefitting?, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 137, 14445 (2011) 
(arguing that social security benefits are structured in a way which favors the 
traditional, nuclear family, thus creating a discriminatory impact toward 
African-American families). 
 99.  See, infra, Section V(a). 
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biological father.100  The lower court originally granted visitation 
to the Aunt because the Child had lived with her for many years, 
during which time she “long filled the role of the only parent for 
the child.”101  Because the father was stationed in the military, 
and because the Child’s twin sister was sick, the Aunt took care 
of the Child from infancy.  The Child continued living with the 
Aunt after both her twin sister and her mother tragically passed 
away.  Her aunt taught her how to walk, talk, and read, made 
and took her to all doctors’ appointments, took her to school and 
church, and ensured that she was participating in 
extracurricular activities.102  The Child called her Aunt “mom” 
and her cousins, the Aunt’s children, her “brothers” and 
“sisters.”103  The Aunt was the only mother that the Child ever 
knew.104 
When the father came back from his deployment, he sought 
to enforce the custody agreement he had with his wife pursuant 
to which he would receive custody of the Child should she 
predecease him.105  He argued that, “in the absence of a statute 
expressly permitting the order of visitation privileges to a 
nonparent, the judge had no legal authority to order the 
visitation.”106  However, the Court disagreed, holding that the 
statute’s failure to expressly mention third parties was not a 
limitation on a judge’s authority to act in accordance with a 
child’s best interests.107  Despite there being no precedent 
regarding de facto parenthood,108 the Court affirmed the Aunt’s 
visitation rights because it was in the Child’s best interest.109  It 
held that it was not a violation of the father’s right because the 
Court found the Child’s welfare to be the controlling 
consideration, paramount to a parent’s interest in the 
relationship with their child.110  The Massachusetts Court in this 
 
 100. 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999). 
 101. Id. at 166. 
 102. Id. at 167. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 168. 
 106. Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Mass. 1999). 
 107. Id. at 170. 
 108. Id. at 175. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 17071.  
 110. Id at 17073.  
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case made it clear that “[i]n every [future] case in which a court 
order has the effect of disrupting a relationship between a child 
and a parent, the question [is] whether it is in the child’s best 
interest to maintain contact with that adult;”111 “[t]o that 
governing principle, every other public and private 
consideration must yield.”112 
 In this case, Robin McAllister, the biological mother of the 
child at issue, restricted visitation with the former Stepfather, 
Mark McAllister.113  Robin and Mark raised this child together 
from birth to when the child was approximately seven years 
old.114 Throughout this time frame, the child’s biological father 
continued to pay child support and exercised parenting time up 
until the child was two years old, and then again when Robin 
and Mark filed for divorce. When the biological mother restricted 
visitation with the stepfather, he filed for custody. The District 
Court awarded the mother decision-making responsibilities and 
primary residential responsibility for the child but awarded the 
stepfather reasonable visitation and that none of the rights 
afforded to the stepfather should affect the legal rights to the 
biological father of the child. The mother appealed this decision 
and the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the District 
Court’s judgment.  The Supreme Court stated that when dealing 
with granting visitation to non-parents, “the rational of 
awarding custody to grandparents is the existence of exceptional 
circumstances that will further the best interest of the child” and 
that “it is appropriate to extend the application of that same 
rational to the award of visitation to a non-parent.”  The Court 
went on further to explain that due to the relationship between 
the child and the stepparent, it is an exceptional circumstance 
that justifies this award of visitation to further the best interests 
of this child. This isn’t a case of the court taking away the rights 
of any parent, but more so a court protecting the emotional needs 
of a child by fostering a parent-like relationship that was formed 
throughout the child’s lifetime. 
 
 111. Id. at 171 (emphasis in original). 
 112. Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Mass. 1999) (quoting 
Richards v. Forrest, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (Mass. 1932)). 
 113. McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652 (N.D. 2010). 
 114. Id.  
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In Connecticut, there is one statute regarding visitation 
with a minor child which states specifically that: 
 
Any person may submit a verified petition to the 
Superior Court for the right of visitation with any 
minor child.  Such petition shall include specific 
and good-faith allegations that (1) a parent-like 
relationship exists between the person and the 
minor child, and (2) denial of visitation would 
cause real and significant harm.115 
 
Connecticut weighs different factors to determine what type of 
relationship the child and adult have.116  These factors include, 
but are not limited to, the length of the relationship, the parent-
like activities that they partake in, the death of one of the child’s 
parents, the fitness of the adult looking for visitation, and the 
fitness of the custodian of the child.117  This type of statute is a 
way to actually consider the relationship with the child and 
determine if visitation is in the child’s best interest. 
Louisiana takes a more restrictive stance in the way it 
allows people to petition for visitation, but it still allows for 
third-party visitation.118  Louisiana’s statute provides that 
“[u]nder extraordinary circumstances, any other relative, by 
blood or affinity, or a former stepparent or stepgrandparent” 
may be granted visitation rights “if the court finds that it is in 
the best interest of the child.”119  This is more restrictive in terms 
of who can petition due to the need of a blood or affinity 
relation,120 yet it is still less restrictive than New York, who 
won’t even hear the petition and dismisses it as procedurally 
defective. 
Wisconsin has taken an even more restrictive stance, and 
yet it still allows more people than New York to petition for 
 
 115. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 2018). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (2018). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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visitation.121  Wisconsin’s visitation statute provides that 
grandparents and stepparents can file for visitation.122 
Comparing these statutes to New York, where there is no 
statute providing visitation for anyone other than the parents, 
grandparents, and siblings, we can see that most states are 
moving toward allowing third party visitation as long as it is in 
the best interest of the child. 
When looking at different statutes that states have in 
relation to third party visitation, the most compelling and 
reasonable statute seems to be Delaware.123  In the State of 
Delaware, a person had grounds for obtaining third-party 
visitation with a child when:  
 
(1) Third-party visitation is in the child’s best 
interests; and, (2) One of the following as to each 
parent: a. The parent consents to the third-party 
visitation; b. The child is dependent, neglected or 
abused in the parent’s care; c. The parent is 
deceased; or d. The parent objects to the visitation; 
however, the petitioner has demonstrated, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the objection 
is unreasonable; and has demonstrated, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the visitation 
will not substantially interfere with the 
parent/child relationship.124 
 
As you can see by the statute, it covers all bases to ensure 
that either the parent agrees or their relationship will not be 
interfered with, as well as situations where the child could be 
living in foster care, all while making sure that it is within the 





 121. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.56 (West 2015). 
 122. Id. 
 123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2412 (West 2006). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
In order to uphold the duty given to the judiciary to protect 
the best interests of the children, New York courts must strongly 
elicit change in the way that current visitation laws are applied 
to situations where the parents are unavailable and there is an 
existence of a third party parental figure in the child’s life.  It is 
time to look beyond unjust precedents, which have essentially 
held that it is in the child’s best interest to have no one visit 
them than someone who is not their parent, grandparent, or 
sibling.  It is time that courts begin to rule using common sense.  
Every child should have a right to be fought for; courts should 
give caregivers of abandoned children a chance to be heard in 
court and not deny them standing based on the sole reason that 
they do not fit within an arbitrary box created by poor past 
legislative and judicial decisions. 
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